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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF TURKEY 
 DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA 
Tek, Hakan 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. A. Gülgün TUNA  
December 2005 
 
This thesis examines the foreign policy decision-making process and its 
functioning in Turkey (especially in Turkey’s troop deployment decisions) within 
the context of the Korean War. Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) shifted with the 
changes in the international era after World War II. The threat perception increased 
resulting in Turkey joining in the United Nations and sending its troops to Korea in 
order to support the USA and to join NATO. The decision of sending Turkish 
troops to Korea was given and executed by a few leaders governing Democratic 
Party. Besides the disputes on the legality of the decision held at the Turkish 
Assembly the main argument was on the political outcomes (being excepted to 
western security institutions). So, by underlining how the decision was given, the 
governing party leaders were criticized rather than the decision itself. In the post-
Cold War era, Turkish Foreign Policy was released from Cold War burdens and 
foreign policy options multiplied.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Korea, Turkish Foreign Policy, United Nations, NATO, Troop 
Deployment, Decision-Making,  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN KORE’YE ASKER GÖNDERME KARAR VERME SÜRECİ 
Tek, Hakan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. A. Gülgün TUNA 
Aralık 2005 
 
Bu tez, Kore savası örnek olayı çerçevesinde dış politika karar verme 
sürecini ve Türkiye’de bu sürecin (özellikle yurtdışına asker gönderme kararları 
alınırken) nasıl işlediğini incelemektedir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile uluslararası 
alandaki değişime  bağlı olarak Türk dış politikası da değişmiş, Türkiye artan tehdit 
algılamaları sonucu Birleşmiş Milletlere üye olmuş; Kore ye asker göndererek 
ABD’nin yanında yer alıp NATO’ya girmeye çalışmıştır. Kore’ye asker gönderme 
kararı hükümette yer alan Demokrat Parti’nin birkaç yöneticisi tarafından alınmış 
ve uygulanmıştır. Mecliste yasallığına dair yapılan tartışmalara rağmen en önemli 
konu siyasi beklentiler( batı güvenlik ittifakına dahil olup olamamak) olmuştur. Bu 
nedenle kararın kendisi değil sadece nasıl verildiği üzerinde tartışılarak karardan 
ziyade hükümetteki parti ve onun liderleri eleştirilmiştir. Soğuk savaşın sona ermesi 
ile birlikte Türk Dış Politikası da rahatlamış, seçenekler artmış ve Türkiye barış 
gücü operasyonlarında daha fazla yer almıştır.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Kore, Türk Dış Politikası, Birleşmiş Milletler, NATO, Asker 
Gönderme, Karar Verme  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Iraq War of 2003 has dominated the foreign policy of Turkey during the 
first half of that year and once again put forward the question of deploying troops 
outside Turkey. The basic problem is that while the military is dedicated to the 
defense of the country, it can neither be deployed outside nor can it be used for the 
political demands of the policies of the governing parties’.1This study aims to 
clarify the foreign policy reactions of Turkey in troop deployment decisions.  
The very first experience of the Turkish Republic to deploy its troops 
outside its territories is the Korean War. Besides objections and the tragic burdens 
(721 deaths, 2147 wounded and 175 missing in action while all 234 prisoners 
returned home), it became a heroic legend of the Turkish Army and labeled its 
Esprit de Corps. The Korean War started at the beginning of the Cold War and led 
the world to a bipolar system. Outside of the Korean War where Turkey, in fact, 
was fighting against the Soviet Union, Turkey refrained from any actions to 
provoke its neighbor during the Cold War. 
After the Korean War, bipolarity became more visible and the international 
era moved towards a balance between the two superpowers. During the Cold War, 
aside from the Korean War, Turkey did not deploy its troops outside or participate 
                                                 
1 A similar statement was made in 1950’s by Nihat Erim (member of RPP and a former Prime 
Minister) at Turkish Daily Ulus and by Kasım GÜLEK the general secretary of the RPP, in Turkish 
Daily Cumhuriyet on 28th July 1950 about the troops sent to Korea. For details see: Türk Parlamento 
Tarihi (History of Turkish Parliament)(1950-1954), Volumes I, TBMMVakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 
2001, p. 750 and p. 759 
 2 
in any peace operations,2 not only to ease the tension between its communist 
neighbors but also to concentrate on its own problems. Domestic conflicts and coup 
d’etat’s, and the bulk of the TFP during the Cold War (disputes with Greece on 
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, which were heightened in 1974 with the intervention in 
Cyprus and came to the brink of a war at 1987), restrained Turkey’s foreign 
policies. 
After the end of the Cold War Turkey was released from its foreign policy 
burdens and moved to a multifaceted and multidimensional policy and became 
more active. Despite the lack of economic power its army, which gained war 
experience after fighting against the ethnic terrorist party PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) for more than 16 years (1984-2001), became an important tool in its foreign 
policies.  
Turkish foreign policy has similarities with other states but it also has some 
differences unique to Turkey, which needs to be stressed. These differences 
emerged from Turkey’s unique position both geographically and 
socioeconomically. Turkey is situated between the West and the East, the South and 
the North. It has a predominantly Muslim population with western institutions and a 
secular regime. It inherited the tradition of the Ottoman Empire but it is founded on 
the characteristics of nation state. It has a strong military that is effective in politics, 
which is different from the West, but also the military is a supporter of 
Westernization, which is different from other developing countries. 
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the foreign policy 
was under the dominance of the leaders who found the new republic. Until the end 
of the World War II that was the case with the one party government. Also, the 
Ottoman heritage was clear during this period. In the following years by joining 
                                                 
2 Neither the Cyprus case, which was made on the basis of a guarantee treaty nor the troops other 
than land forces including observation tasks are within the limits of this thesis. 
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NATO Turkey became a part of the Western security system against the communist 
threat, which shaped the foreign policy options of Turkey during the Cold War.  
This study intends to clarify the decision process of Turkish Foreign Policy 
by evaluating the Korean case. It underlines the external and domestic factors 
together with the legacy that led the leaders of the Turkey to decide to assist USA in 
UN operation in Korea, even without asking the approval of the Turkish Great 
Assembly. 
 The second chapter describes the world in the aftermath of World War II and 
examines the Korean War to clarify the international conjuncture.  
The following chapter glances over post-War period from the TFP 
perspective, the internal agents that forced Turkey to feel insecure and search an 
alliance. The political structure changed from one party rule to a multiparty system 
in 1946. However the first democratic elections would be possible in May 1950. 
Democrat Party, just two months after they came to government, made a decision to 
send troops to Korea. This was novel since Turkey had not sent its troops abroad 
since the establishment of the republic neither attended to a battle. 
The fourth chapter is the assessment of the Korean decision. Besides some 
objections there was little opposition and mostly on ‘how’s rather than the Korean 
decision itself. There seemed to be a consensus on contributing to Korea among the 
actors and an inevitable consensus on the decision after it was ratified in the 
Assembly. The actors refrained from a dispute within the state, which might be 
abused by the Russia, the close and apparent threat.  
The last chapter is the conclusion part, which underlines the mainlines of 
decision-making process of Turkey on sending troops abroad with reference to 
Turkey’s other troop deployment experiences. 
 4 
This study purports to answer the following research questions: What were the 
main factors behind the decision to deploy troops to Korea? How does the ‘Process’ 
function in ‘Troop Deployment’ decisions? Who are the actors and how effective 
are they? What are the tenets of the ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Decisions’?  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND  
THE BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN DECISION 
II.1. The Decision-Making Process  
International relations (IR) being a young branch of science and the need for 
parsimonious theories keep IR students away from a study about which they do not 
have much knowledge. However beginning with Snyder and Paige, IR scholars in 
some way began to touch that area. One of the problems is the ‘level of analysis’ 
that Snyder encourages IR students to go inside the units, the main actors of IR, to 
learn and predict their actions. He stated that examining the inside would ease to 
understand the outside. To review the political science will help us to cover the 
process better. 
Political science, which has to deal with the decision-making, has some 
basic approaches that can be divided as Classical and Radical. Decision-making is 
within the Classical approach of political science. 
 Decision-making also has different approaches while examining the 
process. They are Smith’s ‘homo economicus’, Weber’s ‘rational man’, and as a 
third one the efforts of finding a midway between them. The first one does not look 
for causality, the second one does. To maximize the benefit is common in both and 
 6 
the third one stays between the two approaches and uses the ‘limited rational 
behavior’ model.3  
Homo economicus of Smith, as a rational man:4 
1. In all cases, can give a decision when faces alternatives 
2. Limits the case according to his own preference 
3. The order of the preference is transitive 
4. When making a decision he picks the choice that is on the top of the 
order 
5. In the same cases makes the same choice 
This approach assumes that the decision-maker is rational and makes a 
consistent decision.  
On the contrary, Weber’s rationality is to make the decision according to the 
goals and to reach for them. Weber’s starting point is the cause-result relationship. 
His approach has a hierarchy of the decisions for the man who is inclined to meet 
the goal. The man is rational depending on how successful he is on reaching the 
goal. Still Weber’s rationality does not reject the impact of the environment and 
refer to the compromise. The rational choice is the one that is best within its 
conditions.5  
The decision-making process has three phases: 
1. Limitation of the alternatives 
2. Evaluation of the alternatives 
3. Comparison of the alternatives 
However, this cause-result relation has some embedded problems. First, the 
accuracy of the goal might differ according to different preferences. Second, a strict 
                                                 
3 Kemali Saybaşılı, Siyaset Biliminde Temel Yaklaşımlar (Main Approaches of Political Science), 
BireyToplum, Ankara, 1985, p. 28 
4 Ibid., pp. 27-28 
5 Ibid., pp. 29-31 
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cause-result differentiation cannot be made in reality. Third, time is neglected. 
Therefore some scholars refuse to apply Weber’s model. They base their objections 
on humans’ limited capacity of problem solving and insufficiency of the knowledge 
together with the variety of the choices, high cost of the process, the challenge 
between the theory and the reality, and the integration of knowledge with norms. 
Then in such circumstances the decision is to constitute a new ‘policy’ by focusing 
on the tools rather than the goals. The midway scholars built a new model named 
‘study of disjointed incrementalism’ announcing:6 
1. Choices are together with marginal changes 
2. The choices are limited 
3. Only limited number of outcomes are handled 
4. Generally, the goals are chosen according to an available policy rather 
than choosing appropriate means to reach the goal 
5. The decision making process is executed by public on all levels of the 
society 
6. Analyses and evaluation are made continuously 
In summary, it can be said that decision-making is to choose the best among 
the alternatives. However, like the midway approach put forward, this is not clear in 
all cases. In international relations, the uncertainty and unclear conditions of the 
international arena may lead to debates over the best choice. 
Studying the decision-making structure of foreign policy is important to 
analyze and understand the tenets of a country’s foreign policy. The role of the 
actors, the international conjuncture and tendency of a country embedded the 
possible future behaviors of a country in international relations. Thus, it is 
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp. 32-37 
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important to know the decision-making process within a country to predict an 
international actor’s (the state) behavior.  
Scholars who study the decision-making processes embraced state level 
analysis. The units of analysis are the leaders, groups, organizations that participate 
in the decision-making process7. This study pursues a state level analysis and a 
method in which external and internal settings given before a narrative of the 
decision process and end with an evaluation. However, it has not been possible for 
our case to pursue the process day by day since the decision process of Turkey is 
not always clear and it often takes a long discussion within the state.  
 
II.2. The International Power Configuration After World War II  
“The events within and outside of a state will increase or decrease the ability 
and the freedom of action of the decision-makers. These can be divided as two 
groups internal and external or three as 1) National Power and its elements, 2) 
Decision-Makers, Public Opinion and Interest Groups and 3) Structure of 
International System”.8 The first classification, internal and external, will be used 
while evaluating Turkey’s decision to deploy its troops to Korea. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the most primary stake for the western 
states was to build a peace after a devastating war. The first efforts gave the way to 
the United Nations, an institution that aimed to avoid wars and solve the disputes of 
the new world’s states. However, peace dreams were frozen by the Cold War. The 
world was struggling behind two poles. While warring at peace the states were 
                                                 
7 Glenn D. Paig, The Korean Decision (June 24-30 1950), Free Press, New York, 1968 
8 Tayyar Arı, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika  (International Relations and Foreign Policy), 
Alfa, 4th Edition, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 79-80   
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more secure and could enjoy the peace in this new war. A basic structural change 
occurred in international relations.9 
Turkey, which could succeed not to join the World War II with an active 
neutral policy, was in a worse position than it was during the war. Isolation is the 
word that most scholars agree on for Turkey, which forced it to join on NATO the 
side of the USA and the West. The international ‘conjuncture’10 that led Turkey feel 
alone played an important role on the decision makers of Turkey since “there were 
little objections on troop deployment to Korea and they were on ‘how’ rather than 
‘why’.11 
  
II.2.1. The World in the Aftermath of World War II 
World War II devastated Europe and weakened the European countries both 
in economic and military means. However, the USA and Soviet Russia were still 
powerful. The weakness of European countries had not been a problem until the 
Soviets’ irredentist policy came to surface. Until then the USA had believed a 
peaceful world based on the UN charter was possible.12 Even the Soviet demands 
for Turkish territories and bases on the Turkish straits did not attract enough 
attention for a while. The USA was reluctant to be involved in European policies. 
At that time the USA had 10 divisions all around the world after the war and 
                                                 
9 Mehmet Gök, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının İç ve Dış Kaynakları (Republic Period 
External and Internal Sources of the Turkish Foreign Policy) in Bildiriler: Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Dış 
Politika Sempozyumu (Documents: Foreign Policy Symposium of Atatürk’s Turkey) (1923-1983)’, 
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 55 and Baskın Oran (ed), Türk Dış Politikası 
(1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 480 
10 For a detailed explanation of ‘Conjuncture’ and its applications to Turkish Foreign Policy see: 
Reşat Arım, Foreign Policy Concepts: Conjuncture, Freedom of Action, Equality, Foreign Policy 
Institute, Ankara, 2001, pp. 6-41 
11 Füsun Turkmen,, Turkey and the Korean War, p. 5. Available at EbscoHost file:////A/turkey and 
the korean war.htm 
12  That was the case even on the eve of the Korean War when USA president Truman was thinking 
that ‘the world was closer to the peace than at any time since 1945’. For this statement see Glenn D. 
Paige, The Korean Decision (June 24-30 1950), Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 76 
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preferred to see its soldiers back at home. “The USA policy initially had a tendency 
to go back to isolation as it was before the war”.13 
On the contrary the Soviet leaders’ agenda was to expand their communist 
ideology. The Soviets backed a communist rebellion in Iran, demanded territories 
and common defense of the straits from Turkey sponsored the civil war in Greece 
where Communists and right of center nationalists were fighting together against 
liberals and the supporters of the king. Afterwards the communist parties with the 
support of Soviets began to gain power in their countries, as in Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Poland and also in Czechoslovakia after a coup. The belligerent 
actions of Soviet Russia and its communist expansionist policies increased the 
threat perception of the European countries and the USA as well.14  
 
II.2.2. The Cold War and the USA’s Involvement in Europe 
The US Department of State on February 21, 1947 received two critical 
notes that came from the British Government. They were about the situations in 
Greece and Turkey. Britain invaded Greece to end the German occupation. British 
troops stayed there due to the civil war. However, after the end of World War II 
Great Britain’s economy was suffering due to a lack of food and fuel and more than 
half of its industry stopped. The first note was about Greece. Britain stated that it 
hoped that the United States would be able to take the burden. Britain also declared 
that it was withdrawing from the eastern Mediterranean and that the USA should 
take over its duty, in 38 days.15 If the USA were reluctant to do this, that would 
                                                 
13 Fahir Armaoğlu, 20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Political History of 20th Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı 
Baskı (6th Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, p. 441 
14 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, pp. 8-14 and 
Fahir Armaoğlu, 20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Political History of 20th Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı 
Baskı (6th Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1989,  pp. 423-434  
15 Füsun Turkmen, Turkey and the Korean War, p. 5. Available at EbscoHost file:////A/turkey and 
the korean war.htm  
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mean Soviet superiority in that territory and a ‘loss for the West’.16 
The acute demand that caused American involvement in Europe was made 
by the Britain as mentioned above. US President Truman took the issue to Congress 
and demanded 400 million dollars for military aid to Greece and Turkey in order to 
defend the Western states (and their liberal economies) against Russia.17 This action 
that is known as the Truman Doctrine is the explicit sign of American aid to Turkey 
and a handing over of the duty from Britain as well as the first tangible event that 
symbolizes the containment policy of the USA. “Besides the amount being little, 
the aid was much more important from the historical point of view that it opened 
door for the USA to be a world power and leader.”18 The congressional response to 
Truman proposal “had the effect of giving him legislative approval for the president 
to run the Cold War as he saw fit.”19  
After the Truman Doctrine the United States increased the aid to Europe and 
Marshall Plan, the European Recovery Program came into force. Later, the western 
states decided on economic cooperation and built up the European Economic 
Community and the European Council. The military cooperation, which was the 
nucleus of NATO, followed with the involvement of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, France and Britain.20 This cooperation was not so powerful because 
neither of them (nor all of them together) was strong enough to put up with the 
demands of Soviet Russia. The defense posture of the agreement became more 
apparent and strong with the involvement of the USA in 1951 and paved the way to 
                                                 
16 Truman’s words cited in Hüseyin Bağcı, Türk Dış Politikasında 50’liYıllar (Turkish Foreign 
Policy at 50’s), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 7 
17 Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-
1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, pp. 228 and Fahir Armaoğlu, 20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 
(Political History of 20th Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı Baskı (6th Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, 
Ankara, 1989, pp. 441-442  
18 Burcu Bostanoğlu, Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, 
Ankara, 1999, p.244 
19 Paul M. Edwards, The Korean War, Krieger Publishing Company, Florida, 1999, p.10 
20 The Collective Defense Treaty (also known as Treaty of Brussels) signed on 17 March 1948. 
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NATO, “the organization of the containment”21. The antagonistic policies of Soviet 
Russia let the Europeans join and establish the world’s greatest defense 
cooperation. Soon the alliance would face its first greatest challenge in Far East 
Asia “on the reluctant test ground of the Cold War.”22 
 
II.2.3. A Major Thaw: The Korean War 
Korea is located near the south east of China. Korea was under the 
governance of Japan until 7 November 1945.  Korea had been united and governed 
from one center. The country has been within the interests of China, Japan and 
Russia, until the second half of the 19th Century, which led them to a struggle. The 
USA’s demand was an independent Korea to support its interests in the Pacific.23  
During World War II Koreans hoped to be independent on the basis of the 
Wilson Principles and to slip out from the control of Japan. First talks were held at 
the Cairo Conference in December 1943. The three states, the USA, Britain and 
China decided that Korea would be independent when the appropriate time came.24 
At the Yalta Conference in April 1945, Allies agreed that the removal of the 
Japanese forces in Korea would be made by the USA and Soviet Russia. At the 
Potsdam Conference, the USA referred to the Cairo Conference and underlined that 
the decision on Korea would be applied. The Soviet Union agreed on it and 
declared war on Japan.25 
Japan surrendered at 10 August 1945. After the surrender of 1 million 
Japanese soldiers in China and Manchuria, the USA Minister of Defense asked the 
                                                 
21 Burcu Bostanoğlu, Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, 
Ankara, 1999, p.260. Baskın Oran (ed), Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, 
İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p.485 
22 Hyung-Kook Kim, The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process, University Pres of 
America, New York, 1995, p. xiii 
23 Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953 
(General Staff, Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, 
Ankara, 1975, pp. 5- 13 
24 Ibid., p. 16 
25 Ibid., p. 17 
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Soviet Union to capture of Japanese forces in Korea.26 North of the 38th parallel 
would be under the responsibility of the Soviet Union and the south would be under 
American responsibility. Soviet troops entered into the north of Korea on 12 August 
1945 and the USA troops on 8 September 1945 to capture Japanese troops; thus, 
Korea became divided. When the initial efforts of the USA to unify Korea failed, 
the USA took the case to the UN. The republic of Korea was built up with the 
consent of the UN after the elections on 17 July 1948. On 11 September 1948, the 
American General Hodge handed over the governance to the republic of Korea. Six 
months after the elections in 12 December 1948, the UN recognized ROK as the 
only legal government of Korea. In the south, the People’s Republic of Democratic 
Korea took power on 9 September 1948, which was backed by the Soviets. After 
the governments were in charge, the USA and the Soviet Union withdrew their 
troops, which were anticipated in the UN decision dating 14 November 1947. Only 
500 the USA military advisers were left. The UN commission for Korea took duty 
in 12 December 1948. The commission’s mission was to strive for the unification of 
the Korea that has never been accomplished27. 
On the communist side, following the irredentist policies in Europe, the 
Soviet Union turned to the East. The Soviet Union made an agreement with China 
for 30 years and handed over Manchuria to communist China, which defeated the 
nationalist, in 1949. As the USA backed the Chinese communists, the USSR backed 
the North Korean communists and provoked them for a new war. On 25 June the 
North Koreans passed the 38th parallel to invade the south and to free the whole 
                                                 
26 In most sources the Soviet invasion is given as a unilateral action and the USA’s as a reaction, so 
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the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975, p. 18 
27 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, pp. 11-12. 
Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953 
(General Staff, Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, 
Ankara, 1975,pp. 20-24 
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state. On the same day the UN accepted a resolution and determined the action as a 
‘breach of the peace’ and ‘called upon the authorities of North Korea to cease 
hostilities’ and ‘to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty eighth parallel’.28 The 
resolution was made possible by the absence of the USSR, which had been 
boycotting the presence of Nationalist China in United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) rather than Communist China. On 27 June the UN renovated its resolution, 
one that was handled by Truman himself. The USA leaders were planning an 
operation against North Korean communists.29 
Against more than 183,000 DPRK troops and additional defense forces that 
were deployed at coastal sides and throughout the country, the south only had 
lightly armed forces with a hundred men and a police force numbering 50,000. Both 
were under the authority of the UN. The USA was not able to block the initial 
attack. At that time, the USA had 4 divisions in Japan and only 2 were available to 
use in Korea. Thus, the attack could only be stopped around Pusson, a harbor city to 
the south east of Korea, with the reinforcements, especially the sea and air powers. 
The UN forces then were available to avoid the attacks and push them to the north. 
The UN attack started on 15 August. The UN forces captured Seoul on 28 
September and reached the 38th parallel. On 9 October UN forces passed the 38th 
parallel and kept moving to the north in order to unify and liberate the whole 
country. They reached as near as 70 kilometers to the Chinese border. Only one last 
attack was left to build a new unified Korea. Turkish troops, which arrived in Korea 
20 days before, were at the far front for the last attacks .30 
 
                                                 
28 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, p. 19. Paul M. 
Edwards, The Korean War, p. 89 
29 Hyung-Kook Kim, The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process, University Pres of 
America, New York, 1995, p.9 
30 Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953,  
pp. 25-28. Dean Acheson, The Korean War, pp. 14-16 
 15 
II.3. Turkey after World War II  
Following the end of World War II, the most important problem Turkey was 
facing in the realm of foreign policy was isolation31. During the war, İsmet İnönü, 
who became the president after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of 
the Turkish Republic and the first president) and assumed the leadership of the 
Republican People’s Party of Turkey (RPP), was successful in keeping Turkey out 
of the war and pursuing a neutral policy.32 “Turkey changed its neutrality and 
declared war on Germany in February 1945,”33 “for not being excluded from the 
west and for not to be alone in new order.”34  
On 19 March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov gave notice of 
Moscow’s intention to denounce the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-
Aggression with Turkey. Soviets took another more disturbing step on 7 June 1945, 
and demanded:  
1- The modification of the Turkish-Soviet border demarcated by the 
Moscow Treaty of 16 March 1921, in favor of the Soviet Union; 
2- Joint Turkish-Soviet defense of Turkish straits and the establishment of 
Soviet land and naval bases on the straits, 
3- Revision of the Montreux Convention (1936, that confirmed the regime 
                                                 
31 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974), E. J. Brill, Leiden, 
Netherlands, 1975, p. 3. Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Events and Turkish 
Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974,  p. 206. Edip Çelik, 100 Soruda 
Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Tarihi (History of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in 100 Questions), Gerçek 
Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1969, p.126 
32Available at, http://www.tbb.gen.tr/english/history/inonu_period.html. On the contrary some 
scholars stated that Turkey was ‘non–belligerent’ rather than being ‘neutral’, see Baskın Oran (ed), 
Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 393 
33 That was a diplomatic necessity and was symbolic and aimed to participate in the San Francisco 
Conference which necessitates the declaration of war on Germany in order to be a founding member 
of the UN see Burcu Bostanoğlu, Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası (Policy of Turkish-USA 
Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p. 381. Füsun Türkmen, Turkey and the Korean War, available at 
EbscoHost, file:////A/turkey and the Korean war.htm Baskın Oran (ed), Türk Dış Politikası (1919-
1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 472 
34 Burcu Bostanoğlu, Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, 
Ankara, 1999, p. 381 
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of the Straits) by an agreement of principle. 35 
 The first two demands were rejected directly by Ankara and pointed out 
that any change to the Montreux Convention would necessitate the consent of the 
states that are parties to that convention. After that the Soviet media set off an 
enthusiastic anti-Turkish campaign on territorial claims over two provinces of 
eastern Turkey, Kars and Ardahan.36  
The British leader Churchill raised the issue at the Potsdam Conference in 
August 1945. During the meeting, he made clear to Stalin (the leader of the USSR) 
that the straits issue was of international concern. Truman seemed to be in 
agreement, but despite the apparent consensus about bringing Montreux up to date, 
no final decision was reached. Truman declared that territorial claims should be 
determined bilaterally between Turkey and the Soviet Union.37 
 Moscow sent another note to Turkey on 7 August 1946, repeating its 
demands on participation in the administration of the Straits and their joint control. 
On August 19, Washington sent a reply backing firmly the Turkish position and 
stressing the need for Turkey to maintain single control over the Straits. Moreover, 
the U.S. note designated that attacks or threats against the Straits would clearly be 
matters for action by the UN Security Council. 
 The second note, which was given to the USA by Britain, was about 
Turkey, where Britain had also been giving economic and military assistance 
needed by this country to stand up against Soviet pressure. Since the end of World 
War II, Turkey was facing two serious economic problems:  
                                                 
35 Haluk Ülman, Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign 
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36 Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-
1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 207. Baskın Oran (ed), Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), 
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37 Haluk Ülman, Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign 
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1- The return of war-inflated export prices to normal; 
2- The necessity of military readiness coupled by massive efforts of 
industrialization. 38 
At a Special Joint Session of Congress on 12 March 1947 President Truman 
made a long speech including the latest economic and political circumstances in 
Greece and Turkey, assuring support to both countries. Then he announced the 
statement that is known as the Truman Doctrine: “I believe that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Afterwards the President 
requested authority from Congress for $400 million until 30 June 1948, to provide 
assistance to Greece and Turkey. He also asked for authority to assign military and 
civilian personnel to work in Greece and Turkey.39 The Assistance Act to Greece 
and Turkey came into force on 22 May 1947 after ratification by Congress. “Soviets 
announced that it would be a ‘threat to world peace’ and decided to take the issue to 
the UN Security Council but gained nothing.”40 
The following aid would be economic, which aimed for the renovation of 
the western European states. Turkey demanded again to be included in this Marshall 
plan; however, Turkey was denied this aid at first since it had already been taking 
military aid and was not destroyed like the western European states because Turkey 
had not fought in the war. The continuing demands of Turkey made it available for 
                                                 
38 Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-
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39 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, p. 8. Haluk 
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it to get the aid at the end.41 This was significant for Turkey since its economic 
policy depended on foreign aid.42 
II.4. Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s Contributions to 
Korean War  
As mentioned previously ‘isolation’ was one of the characteristics of the 
Turkish Foreign Policy, in the aftermath of World War II. Another characteristic 
was the ‘change’43 that Turkish Foreign Policy would bear in the Korean decision. 
While one of the tenets embodied in the motto of Atatürk ‘peace at home, peace in 
the world’ was wearing out, another one ‘westernization’, was being championed.44 
Yet, when the application to NATO is considered rather than the decision of 
sending troops to Korea, some scholars suggest that it was inevitable for Turkey, a 
country that could never be neutral throughout its history with the exception of 
World War II.45  
Deploying troops outside one state’s territory, on the basis of the UN 
Charter, means attending to a softened war. After the demise of the USSR this was 
more apparent, if not during the Cold War. The peace operations mandated under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter turned out to be harsher and began to look like a 
war. Thus, troop deployment gained the priority in international relations, a 
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discipline that aims to prevent wars. That was the case also in the Korean War 
where the UN was on one side and fighting in an interstate war. Examining a state’s 
decision to send troops then may guide one to obtain the details of its behaviors and 
realize the changes and continuities in its foreign policy. That was the case in 
Turkey’s decision to send its troops to Korea which is important as being itself a 
critical and risky decision, and as being a marginal point for the Turkish foreign 
policy, one that embedded the previous developments and guidelines for future 
events. This would be similar in following decisions on troop deployment, which 
also reflects the changes of Turkish Foreign Policy. The following events will guide 
readers to the context in which the decision was made. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF  
DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA 
III.1. The Korean War: Turkish Decision to Send Troops  
Less than two months after the elections of 1950 that brought Menderes 
come to power, the Korean War broke out. On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces 
had crossed the 38th parallel to launch an all-out armed invasion of South Korea. 
The UN Security Council immediately condemned the attack as a threat to world 
peace and recommended that the UN members come to the aid of South Korean 
forces. A unified UN Command would be established in order to repel North 
Korean aggression and restore peace in the area.46  
A cabinet meeting of governing Democrat Party (DP) was quickly convened 
on 18 July 1950 and the decision to send troops to Korea was taken by some seniors 
of the DP at Yalova near Istanbul.47 On 25 July 1950, the Menderes government 
announced its decision to send a 4,500-man brigade to Korea. This was a clear 
change because the armed forces were going outside their borders to a war for the 
first time after the establishment of the republic.48 “Foreign Minister Köprülü was 
proud of being the second state, after the USA, which responded to the invitation of 
                                                 
46 Paul M. Edwards, The Korean War, Krieger Publishing Company, Florida, 1999, p. 89 
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UN General Secretary, Tyrgue Lie.”49 
 
III.2. A New Government: Democrat Party’s (DP) Policy  
The DP foreign policy, according to its governmental program, can be 
summarized as entering to Western institutions, particularly to NATO, to make 
investments to strengthen the insufficient and outmoded infrastructure and obtain 
economic development by benefiting from foreign aids as much as they can and to 
tighten its relations with western states, France, Britain and especially the USA, and 
secure the country.50 
The DP members criticized the RPP as being slow and inefficient to join 
western institutions. They also criticized İnönü because of his reluctance to join 
World War II. They even stated that “RPP discouraged the Turks and acted 
cowardly towards the USSR.”51 
Yet, when the DP won the elections in 195052 they were afraid of a coup, 
which was a wide gossip. When some generals informed İnönü that they were ready 
for a coup if he demanded it, he rejected such a move since he was determined to 
refrain from any tricks or a coup.53 He assumed his support for the government in 
bilateral talks with Celal Bayar. On 6th of July 1950, the DP assured its governance 
by making a wide change on the command of the army.54  
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The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) selected Celal Bayar, the 
leader of DP, as the president of the country. The prime minister, Adnan Menderes, 
who was assigned by Bayar when he was in his office to ask for Köprülü to be 
prime minister.  Bayar insisted on Menderes to be the prime minister.55 
Bayar and Menderes were members of the RPP. They came together to 
establish a new party when that was freed by the RPP’s leader İnönü. They were 
more liberal and accused the RPP of being more prone to state control. When they 
won the elections besides other factors common to both parties, they saw 
westernization as a tool for their survival because they were able to build a party 
and came to government by the help of western states. They were lucky that İnönü’s 
dilemma, the demands of the west, and deficiency of the economy prompted İnönü 
to adopt multiparty elections in order to be accepted in to western institutions which 
would result in Turkey receiving financial aid packages, caused him lose the 
government.  
The first effort of DP to survive would be sending troops to Korea in order 
to join NATO and to satisfy Turkey’s strategic partner, the USA. Moreover, the DP 
would win its second round against the RPP, which was refused in the first 
application for NATO membership. 
 
III.3. The Opposition Party (RPP) and Objections 
After governing Turkey under the rule of one party for 27 years, the RPP 
became the opposition party in the elections of 14 May 1950. The leader of the 
party was İsmet İnönü; the second leader in the Liberation war of Turkey became 
the second leader of the party as well.  He succeeded Atatürk and became the 
president of Turkey and ruled for 12 years.  He became an important actor in 
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foreign policy during the Second World War and kept Turkey away from joining 
that war.  
In the aftermath of World War II, İnönü was faced with many challenges. 
His authority and position began to decrease. “The international era weakened the 
one party rule in Turkey.”56 UN membership, international refusal of totalitarian 
regimes as in Italy and Germany, the increasing domestic problems, security that 
was threatened by the USSR and the huge army against it with economic burdens 
prompted İnönü to adopt multiparty elections.57 The RPP won the elections of 1946 
with suspicion that the RPP cheated. The elections were made to prove that Turkey 
was ready to satisfy Western requirements. Moreover, to ease the demands of the 
USSR might be another one that affected İnönü’s decision.58  Turkey was once 
again trying the multiparty experiment and that would be successful with the first 
democratic elections, which would be held in less than five years. 
The motive of transition to democracy was ‘Westernization,’ the process 
that was assumed as the base for economic, military and political development. 
That was the case on 11 May 1950, just before the elections, when the RPP made 
the first official application of Turkey for NATO membership.59 But the NATO 
members declined it. As the refusal of the application the citizens refused their 
governance in 14 May the DP was signed to build up the new government. 
The RPP generally backed the new government’s foreign policy since two 
parties were similar; the DP members were the old members of the RPP. This was 
the case until the end of 1950s with an exception of the troop contribution to the 
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Korean War.60 However, the objections to troop deployment were not acute. The 
RPP and its leader İsmet İnönü tended also to assist the USA but in a less dangerous 
way. They offered to deploy a non-battle troop to Korea as some other countries 
(Greece) did. They raised objections on the timing that the government hurried to 
give that decision. The other objection was on the legality of the decision that the 
government was required to consult to the Great Assembly, which was the only 
authority on the basis of the constitution. Still, they did not paralyze the process and 
ratified the decision in the Assembly at the session about Korea in December 
1950.61 
İsmet İnönü regretted the leaders of the DP. İnönü stated his demands as it 
would be better if they had asked him, a leader who was in the governance from the 
very beginning of the republic. “He pointed out that during World War II; he had 
consulted the Parliament even before cutting economic relations with Germany.”62 
As far as Korea was concerned, his preoccupation was to be a part of a common UN 
front. İnönü seemed to be skeptical towards an eventual UN support in case of a 
similar attack against Turkey. But then, he had no objection towards the very 
substance of the decision. However, İnönü’s objections seem to be more like a 
lecture and an advice for his students, to the ex-members of the RPP. 
 
III.4. The Legal Aspect and Disputes at the Assembly 
According to the Constitution of 1924, the legislation was superior to 
execution. The constitution embraced the unity of the powers and made the Turkish 
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Grand National Assembly the superior authority and gave the power of legislation 
and execution to the Assembly. The Assembly’s power was due to the citizens 
rather than the constitution and it embodied the sovereignty of the state. According 
to the 1924 Constitution, there was a strong hierarchy between the Assembly and 
the President and the Ministers. The responsibility of execution and application of 
foreign policy was given to the President and the Council of Ministers; however the 
final authority was the Assembly. The Assembly was not commissioned the 
government to form the foreign policy.63 (See Table 1.1: Foreign Policy Model-
1924 Constitution) 
 
Table 1.1: Foreign Policy Model-1924 Constitution64 
TABLE 1.1 
From the legal aspect the decision has some shortcomings and may be 
labeled as illegal on the basis of the 1920 constitution. However, the decision was 
made on the basis of an international law, which was ratified by the Great Assembly 
and thus legalized the decision. The independent deputy Kemal Türkoğlu and the 
only deputy of the Nation Party, Osman Bölükbaşı introduced with a view to 
discuss the government’s decision to send troops to Korea in Parliament. Türkoğlu 
and Bölükbaşı referred to the legality of the decision and put forward that UN 
Charter allows such decisions but that would not mean that it is binding. The UN 
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Charter does not allow the government to by-pass the Assembly or the constitution. 
Türkoğlu and Bölükbaşı also referred to Article 47 of the Charter and stated that the 
UN resolution would be binding if the military staff had been operated. The DP 
rejected the latter and strictly accused the Soviets of paralyzing UNSC efforts in 
order to keep the UN away from its irredentist actions. 
While the oppositions were on the legal points and on the technical analyses 
of the laws, the government insisted on their legality and underlined that they were 
‘right’ and preferred to stress the significance of participating with West and 
assisting the USA. Kemal Türkoğlu and the Nation Party (NP) agreed on the 
decision with abstention on the legality. Türkoğlu insisted that if the decision was 
ratified at the Assembly that would mean full support of all parties and the public 
and would underline its coherence in the eyes of outside enemies. The leader of the 
NP declared that the decision would be valuable if NATO membership for Turkey 
was guaranteed. The RPP differed in the size and the scope of the troops and 
stressed that the troops could have a non-combatant role like Greece and some other 
European states. Opposition spokesman Faik Ahmet Barutçu accused the 
government of having violated Article 26 of the Constitution, which stipulated that 
“the power to declare war and participate in a war as well as to declare peace 
belongs to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.”65 
At the time of the disputes, which were held in November about 4 months 
after the decision Turkish troops were fighting bravely in the far front of the battle. 
The heroic fights strengthened the DP’s position. Prime Minister Menderes 
responded that his government’s decision had been taken upon the appeal of the UN 
Security Council and, consequently, could not be considered as declaration of war, 
thus Article 26 had not been violated. Following heated exchanges between 
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government and opposition members, the proposal was voted upon. The result was 
an overwhelming defeat for the opposition: 311 against, 39 for, 1 abstention. One 
hundred nineteen deputies did not join the voting.66 One year later, when asked by a 
reporter about the reasons of his bypassing the opposition while sending troops to 
Korea, Menderes responded: “Since we have seen that our country’s safety depends 
on taking long term risks and on keeping the initiative in foreign policy… we could 
not leave America alone in its struggle for the free world. Our NATO membership 
is due to our efforts in this way. Turkey is labeled as a ‘big power’ in international 
relations.”67 
In the initial declaration of the DP, they condemned the North Korean troops 
and the Soviets, and backed strongly the decision of the UN. Köprülü stated this 
thought at the Great Assembly on July 30. All deputies supported the decision and 
applauded the government. However that decision was only about Turkey’s support 
for the UN but not about sending combat troops to Korea.  The troops were ordered 
on 3 August and sailed to Korea on 18 September. The UN was back on the 38th 
parallel and was moving to the north to occupy all of Korea and liberate all 
Koreans.  Turkish troops participated in the last attack, which was at a 70 
kilometers distance from the Chinese border. However, they were not aware of the 
Koreans and Chinese troops which were poised for a counter attack. Turkish troops 
had one of their most heroic battles during this fight. 
Briefly, the disputes revolved around the relations between international law 
and the Turkish constitution. The government party DP, preferred a political stance 
that they were right and the UN Charter Articles give them the legality to deploy 
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troops outside. The objections repeatedly forwarded that ratification by the Great 
Assembly would mean the complete consent of Turkey. The DP’s leader refused to 
state that the issue was urgent. It was difficult to clarify the legality of the decision 
but the government legitimized it by stating that they would get some national 
stakes. Yet the stakes were kept secret by Menderes. 
 Turkey would face similar debates later on following troop deployment 
cases. In the 1990s the governing Motherland Party decided to deploy troops to the 
Gulf War. The RPP took the case to the Constitutional Court. Ahmet Nejdet Sezer, 
member of the Constitutional Court and later the President, labeled it as illegal 
according to the 1980 constitution.68 On the other hand, and different from previous 
processes, the Justice and Development Party took the case to the Assembly and 
asked for the consent to deploy troops in Iraq War. With an arithmetic irony, the 
majority was obtained but decision has not been ratified due to the abstentions.  
 
III.5. Public Opinion and the Media 
Public opinion in Turkey welcomed the government’s decision to send 
troops to the Korean War with great interest. The newspapers published many 
articles on relations with West. They were very sensitive to the membership of 
western organizations as well as foreign aids. They reflected the enthusiasm for the 
USA aid with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The dailies reflected the 
disappointment of the public when Turkey was refused NATO membership. When 
the Korean decision was declared they deemed it as a path to NATO membership 
and a strong, permanent step in westernization for Turkey’s security. They referred 
to the importance of collective defense and collective security and underlined that if 
Turkey wanted other states to help it then Turkey had to fulfill its responsibilities. 
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The Turkish troops in the Korean War would let Turkey ask for help when Turkey 
needed in case.69 Another reason was the demands of the Soviets that revived 
‘Russian phobia’70. There was a great enmity against Russia because of the long 
wars in the past between Turks and Russians. The last belligerent policies once 
again surfaced the enmity, which has been ceased since the establishment of the 
new republic. The Russians’ anti-UN broadcasts were countered with patriotic 
articles and radio programs.71 Yet the propaganda and censorship of the DP 
government might also have been effective on the public and on some members of 
media.72 The government also used radio broadcasts for its propaganda and traveled 
through villages within the ‘Korean Campaign’. The newspapers had been a field 
for the arguments of the parties during the decision.73 However ‘The Society of 
Peace Lovers’ would be closed on 28 July 1950 due to their declaration, dating 14 
July, which condemned the Korean decision. As a harsher measure taken in August, 
seventeen Humor Magazines were closed because of being ‘communist.’74  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
TURKEY’S ADMISSION TO NATO:  
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION 
The last attack of the UN troops in Korea had been stopped with a counter 
attack of North Koreans that were reinforced by ‘more than 400,000 Chinese 
troops.’75 American leaders refused the continuing demands of General McArthur 
for an attack on Manchuria and Chinese troops. The USA preferred to keep the war 
local within Korea and prevent a new world war and so just blamed China and 
Russia.76 The 4500 troops of Turkey arrived in Korea on 18 September under the 
command of Major General Tahsin Yazıcı. After some duties on the rear, the troops 
were on the way to the north beginning on 10 November. When they arrived at the 
front they were ordered to cover the right flank of the USA’s 9th Army Corps, 
which would let Turkish troops move towards the Chinese troops that were on the 
way to south, to the rear of the 8th Army. The bloodiest battles of the Turkish 
Brigade would be in the following days. On 28 November at Wavon, on 29 
November at Sinnam-ni, on 30 November at Kunu Ri, Turkish soldiers were 
fighting bravely even with bayonets against multiple Chinese troops and preserved 
a possible surrender of the 8th USA Army with the ‘Kunu-Ri Victory’. During 1951 
Turkish soldiers fought at Sunchon (1 December), at Kumyangjang-ni (25 January) 
and were back at the 38th parallel in June. 721 men were killed, 2147 were 
wounded, 346 got sick and 175 were declared missing in action. All 234 prisoners 
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returned home.77 During 1950-1960 ten brigades were deployed but only the first 
three brigades fought (1950-1953). Until the end of the mission, 25,000 Turkish 
soldiers were sent to Korea with 10 percent casualties. Turkey’s reward of bravery 
and self-sacrifice was admission to NATO.’78  
To evaluate Turkey’s decision to send its troops to the Korean War, it is 
better to raise the question whether it was the main reason for Turkey’s admission 
to NATO, or if it just accelerated the process that Turkey would be invited to the 
alliance anyway since the conjuncture had changed and the USA and Britain were 
ready to accept Turkey’s membership more than before. 
Most authors prefer to accept that the Turkish troops in Korean War led the 
way to Turkey’s membership in NATO. Many of them see it as a step for NATO 
since they were successive events and it is easier to shortcut than explain a complex 
era that led Turkey join the alliance. However this study asserts the opposite view 
suggesting that even if Turkey had not joined the Korean War, it would be a 
member of the alliance soon. Thus the Korean War was ‘no gain’ game for Turkey 
either, like the parties of the war. It will be sarcastic to say that Turkey gained its 
Western alliance through the Korean War since the war just left back unnamed 
monuments of the casualties, the 38th parallel underlying the division of the world 
and nothing else. 
Some scholars and journalists claim that Turkey would join NATO even if 
she had not participated in the Korean War. They stated that the international 
conjuncture benefited Turkish demands, and that sooner or later, Turkey’s 
adherence to NATO was inevitable, and so there was no need to send troops to 
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Korea.79  The USA backed Turkey’s NATO membership in May 1951, as US 
Military Staff referred to the strategic importance of the Turkey. Also, at that time, 
the Strategic Air Command was thinking of a system that would encircle the USSR 
and so Turkish airfields could therefore be available for NATO allies. 
Britain had been planning to build up a defense organization in the Middle 
East to preserve its bases. Turkey was the key state for Britain to accomplish the 
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Turkey tended to accept its model role 
since Turkey deemed it an extension of NATO. When Israel was founded Turkey 
took a stance against Arabs.  On the other hand Egypt rejected Britain’s demands 
and hindered the establishment of the MEDO. Besides this disappointment Britain 
preferred to compensate itself with having the command of the Turkish troops if it 
joined NATO. London insisted upon relating Turkey’s NATO membership to a 
Middle Eastern regional arrangement. The Menderes government was willing to 
play such a role if London assured support for Turkey’s application. At last the 
British Government decided that the best way was to admit Greece and Turkey to 
the Alliance. 
Another important actor was George McGhee whom Bağcı presented as the 
key person for Turkey’s NATO membership.80 Also Ambassador Feridun C. Erkin 
stated that the government started a new campaign, which would be more realistic 
since they took Congress into account and were more intensive.81 The admission of 
Greece may be the evidence that Turkey did not have to make heroic fights to 
convince NATO members. Furthermore, the West was realistic enough to examine 
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Turkey’s importance not only with a battle. However, the hasty decision of the DP 
government to back the USA might have impressed the Americans as Turkey would 
be a reliable partner. “Adnan Menderes, the new Turkish Prime Minister, would, in 
turn, prove to be a reliable and loyal ally to Washington.”82 Above all, the NATO 
relationship served as a new base of Turkish-American relations including its 
political, economic, and military aspect. The ‘visit of Missouri’ enhanced with 
NATO membership of Turkey, which would become “an outpost for containment 
with its 22 Divisions.”83 The USA gained some bases in Turkey that it had asked 
for previously but Turkey refused it unless it became a NATO member.84 
Füsun Türkmen stated that ‘Korea has been a catalyst in accelerating 
Turkey’s integration to the Western security system’ and its role for ‘Turkey’s 
admission to the Western security scheme and in determining its political path 
throughout the Cold War seems irrefutable.’85   
Relating the NATO membership with participation in Korean War was in 
the center of the discussions from the very beginning of the convention held at the 
Assembly. On the eve of the decision when the ministerial meeting was held, 
Ambassador Sarper- then Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN - asserted 
that the assistance to South Korea should be directly related with entrance to 
NATO. Erkin refused that idea since that would be a serious error and depreciate 
the decision. He said: ‘We should rather fulfill our duty in helping South Korea and, 
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on the other hand, continue our efforts to join NATO without setting up any linkage 
between the two.’86 
When we rationalize the DP’s decision, it can be said that the government’s 
main motive to send troops to Korea may be to join the Western Alliance or to get 
the most portion of joining it. Through the conversations on the Great Assembly 
besides sincere explanations on the issue, the parties mostly search for their political 
gains. The NATO membership would be “a great victory for the government”87 and 
will end “diplomatic and military isolation experience since 1878.”88 
From a legal perspective, it is better to restate some debates that occurred 
within the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The debates were centered upon 
Article 26 of the Constitution and Articles of the UN Charter under Chapter 7, 
which designates the actions (use of force) against ‘threats to the peace,’ ‘breaches 
of the peace’ and ‘acts of aggressions.’89  
Article 42 refers to the military enforcement measures, Article 43 requires 
the assistance of all UN members to the Security Council via agreements and 
through their constitutions, and Article 46 foresees a UN Army with the assistance 
of the Military Staff. Article 47 states the establishment of the Military Staff and its 
species.90 
Faik Ahmet Barutçu, the spokesman of the RPP, underlined that the Article 
43 of the UN Charter refers to the bilateral agreements for troop contribution and so 
the decision should have been adopted in the constitution, especially Article 26, and 
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be voted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.91 Fuad Köprülü, Turkey’s 
Foreign Minister, refused his proposal and underlined that the agreements were 
supposed to be done with the military staff committee according to the Article 47, 
which could not be done because of the known reasons.92 Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes declared that the decision was made on the basis of Article 42 rather than 
Article 43 and so the decision did not need the approval of Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA), since it allows the actions against the aggressor without 
referring to bilateral agreements.93 Another deputy, Cezmi Türk, pointed out that 
Article 51 of the UN Charter even permits regional arrangements and organizations 
to collaborate against the aggressor.94 Osman Bölükbaşı, the only deputy of the NP 
in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, summarized Chapter 7 of the UN Charter 
and explained that Articles 39, 41, 42, 43 and 44, opposed the resolution of the 
government that Article 42 gave them the authority to deploy troops in a war.95 
Menderes went over the same articles from his point of view and uttered that 
deploying troops outside was within the authority of the government. If the 
government had taken the issue to the TGNA for approval then it would mean ‘to 
escape from its responsibility.’96 Against the question of independent deputy Kemal 
Türkoğlu, whether the decision was taken by unanimous votes of all ministers, and 
whether the contingent is standard (will be reinforced to keep the number same-
about 5000), the Prime Minister confirmed the unanimity but refused to answer the 
latter due to the security of the country.97 Discussions followed with examples from 
other states’ actions and discussions on the legality. Through the session almost all 
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seemed to support the decision in some way since the Turkish troops were fighting 
in far front at that time. The debates came to an end with voting and the decision 
was ratified by TGNA. “After the Korean case, foreign policy decisions began to be 
discussed in TGNA”98. 
Turkey was a water-full glass bottle in the icebox (if the degree goes deeper 
the sensitivity of water would increase and would brake the glass). Hopefully 
Turkey was not broken. However the water (TFP options) was frozen and would 
take a long and hard time to take it out and flow it. 
 On the other side, the generals of the army, who were silenced with the 
changes on the command structure by DP, would make much more noise later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Baskın Oran (ed) Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980) Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 
548 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Korean War was the first case that Turkey deployed its troops outside 
its territories. During the Cold War Turkey did not participate in peace operations 
nor deployed its troops outside.99 After the end of the Cold War Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations increased and Turkey deployed its troops in 
Somalia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. All three cases were international operations 
made with the consent of the UN. 
Decision-making, in short, is to choose the best among the alternatives. This 
is not the same all the time in international relations. The uncertainty and unclear 
conditions of international relations may lead to debates over the best choice. While 
handling decisions, there is not only one ‘right choice’ since it depends on the 
assumptions and is evaluated according to the outcomes. In the Turkish foreign 
policy decision process, the instant and short timed outcomes are valued more 
highly by the decision makers. As in Korea, the most important outcome looked for 
by the decision makers have been NATO membership whereas in the case of 
Afghanistan it was to recover from the economic crisis with American aid. 
Briefly, it can be said that the success of the decision would be possible if 
the assumptions of the decision makers are precise and parallel to reality, which 
would inevitably lead to the right solutions, and would also assist researchers and 
decision makers in being able to predict future reactions of TFP in troop 
deployment decisions and to develop causality forecasts. 
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In the Korean case, Turkey’s decision seemed to be illegal on the basis of 
the 1924 constitution. But the discussions were on ‘how’ rather than ‘why’. It was 
the first time that foreign policy was discussed publicly. When Turkey sent its 
troops to Korea it tried to be supporting of the USA so as to get American aid and 
be a NATO member. As a short sighted evaluation, the NATO membership made 
the Turkey’s decision of deploying its troops in the Korean War valuable, but the 
question ‘Why did Turkish soldiers die in Korea?’ is still lacking an adequate 
answer. 
In the Somalia decision, Turkey’s motive seemed to be its membership to 
western institutions (NATO, UN). Besides the enthusiasm of Cevik Bir’s chief role 
in UNSOM II, the Somalia decision had little attention in Turkish foreign policy 
due to being out of Turkey’s interests. The lacking Turkish source on Somalia and 
on UNSOM may be indicators of the above interpretation.  
On the contrary Yugoslavia took much more attention not only on the 
Turkish foreign policy agenda but also in public opinion. The religious and ethnic 
enthusiasm of the public might be the factor. Yalım Eralp, a Turkish Ambassador, 
put forward that Turkey was pressed to send troops to Somalia. However, in the 
Yugoslavia case Turkey tried in vain to convince the other states that the situation 
was in need of international response.100 
Contributing to ISAF and leading it can be a model for troop deployment 
decisions of Turkey, which also underlines the burdens of such operations. Turkey 
was eager to lead ISAF but the possible outcomes revealed its political, military and 
economic disabilities: A future Iraq operation, turmoil in politics, inability of the 
army to deploy its troops to long distances and slender economy that would not put 
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up with additional load. Yet, the American aid, the prize of hegemonic power to its 
assistants, helped Turkey to recover the above problems. 
In all cases similar fundamentals became explicit in Turkish foreign policy, 
which lead the decision makers: ‘Westernization’, ‘security’, ‘non-involvement in 
neighboring countries’, and Atatürk’s peaceful aphorism ‘peace at home and peace 
abroad’. Also through decision-making process we can see the problems that 
limited the Turkish foreign policy dynamism and made the process more complex. 
The main problem seems to be economic (Korea, ISAF). Security depends on the 
economy since Turkey would be able to handle the threats if it had a better 
economy. And the army is powerful enough to secure the country in all cases even 
in the worst scenarios, as it was during World War I (1914-1918) and the War of 
Independence (1919-1922). The vulnerability might have been the second handicap 
of Turkey participating in peace operations, however only in Korea Turkey had 
casualties.  
The decision-making process depends on the actors. The role of the military, 
absence of a long lasting government, and absence of a powerful leader (especially 
presidency), which made Turkey unable for to take ‘ad hoc’ and immediate 
decisions are the other shortcomings of Turkish Foreign Policy. 
In the post-Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy has two major objectives as 
its vision for the future.101 The first goal is to make Turkey an integral part of the 
European integration process. The second, goal is to transform Turkey into an 
essential and rich country at the center of the huge geography called Eurasia. The 
Turkish army, as the second largest in NATO and the best-trained and equipped one 
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in its region, is an important instrument for Turkey to achieve these goals.102 It can 
be said that the main object of the TFP has been to restore security in order to keep 
its independence. Therefore Turkey worked hard to strengthen UN as much as she 
did for its defense.103  
As Füsun Turkmen stated ‘the western dream has the face of the European 
Union. And most certainly, the way to the EU will not pass by another war. Peace 
being always more difficult to achieve than war, Turkey has yet to strive for its 
chosen destiny.’104 On the contrary, in the Iraqi War Turkey became close to being 
involved in a war not mostly because of its security perceptions on Southern Iraq 
but because of its ‘dream’. After all thanks to the soldiers who participated in the 
above cases and succeeded in their jobs, the actors of TFP were relieved. 
Besides the importance of external factors in the case of Turkey the internal 
factors seem to be much more effective in the foreign policy. This is not because of 
the    constitutional foundations of foreign policy but due to ‘de facto’ limitations on 
it. These limitations are mainly based on the security perceptions, which may be 
taken as a ‘natural reflex’ of such ‘modernizing states’. Turkey’s political 
complexity and ambiguous identity make it more difficult to examine Turkish 
Foreign Policy decisions. The troop deployment decisions of Turkey are generally 
reflexive and can be called as ‘Alice Syndrome’105. The decision to go to war in 
Korea is an example to support the above idea. While it was a crisis for the USA, it 
was only a receipt for Turkey given by the USA and frightened by Russia instead of 
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Alice curiosity. The Korean decision was not a crisis management for Turkey; 
rather it was a choice that Turkey was trying to make after World War II to 
cooperate with USA. However calling Turkish troop deployment decisions an 
‘Alice Syndrome’ would be an underestimation of the role of the actors of Turkish 
Foreign Policy, especially the ministry of foreign affairs and the military the two 
most institutionalized organs of the Turkish republic. Further research can look into 
the cases of Somali, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and inquire decision-making 
process of Turkey contributing to UNSOM, UNPROFOR (IFOR-SFOR) and ISAF. 
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